Adam Savage: "Mythbusters is Entertainment, Not Science"

Quote from: trig on May 02, 2011, 02:26:24 PM

So, you are able to quote a philosopher saying "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation". Who is he?

David Hume! Go and read the Treatise on Human Nature - a good edition will tell you exactly where the sections on causality are.

OK, I read the most relevant part of this book, Part III, Of Knowledge and Probability, Section I, "Of Knowledge", and Section IV. "Of the Component Parts of our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect" And guess what? He says the exact opposite of your "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation".

When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an inference from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on, till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember. 'Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry.

So the inference does not come from correlation. It comes, among other things, from "inference from other causes". Sorry, but it is again your selected author and your quoted book. In fact I could not find any mention to the use of correlations, except for correlative ideas, which is not even close to the mathematical or statistical concept of correlations.

This is getting quite ridiculous. You have not found any way to support your contention on the examples I have given, from Einstein and Newton. I found out that Galileo also had thought about light having a finite speed, but in your own words, the ideas of the treatise "Opticks" were radical. No correlation of known variables could give Newton the idea that light might be a stream of particles and that those particles would obey his laws of mechanics.

Whatever the process of finding a cause for a phenomenon, you can either say that we just don't know how we do it in the most complicated cases or you can quote David Hume and others who give some indications, but never a total and comprehensive answer as your "correlation is the sole basis for causation". You cannot reduce the process of jumping from a few particular cases to a cause-effect relationship to mathematical correlations of variables.

Quote from: Lord Wilmore on May 02, 2011, 03:59:55 PM

Quote from: trig on May 02, 2011, 02:26:24 PM

So, you are able to quote a philosopher saying "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation". Who is he?

David Hume! Go and read the Treatise on Human Nature - a good edition will tell you exactly where the sections on causality are.

OK, I read the most relevant part of this book, Part III, Of Knowledge and Probability, Section I, "Of Knowledge", and Section IV. "Of the Component Parts of our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect" And guess what? He says the exact opposite of your "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation".

Quote

When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an inference from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on, till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember. 'Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry.

So the inference does not come from correlation. It comes, among other things, from "inference from other causes". Sorry, but it is again your selected author and your quoted book. In fact I could not find any mention to the use of correlations, except for correlative ideas, which is not even close to the mathematical or statistical concept of correlations.

Tell me trig, what do you think is meant by "immediate perception of our memory or senses"? If you had actually read the book, you would know that Hume is grounding causal inferences in the observation of empirical data, which he elsewhere undermines as a basis for such inferences due to the impossibility of certain knowledge. I'm sorry, but you simply don't know what you're talking about.

This is getting quite ridiculous. You have not found any way to support your contention on the examples I have given, from Einstein and Newton. I found out that Galileo also had thought about light having a finite speed, but in your own words, the ideas of the treatise "Opticks" were radical. No correlation of known variables could give Newton the idea that light might be a stream of particles and that those particles would obey his laws of mechanics.

We were talking about light having a finite speed. Now you're telling me that Galileo (in addition to Descartes) also came to that conclusion. I guess that means I was right to say that this idea was not radical. In any event, this part of our debate no longer has much to do with the central issue.

Whatever the process of finding a cause for a phenomenon, you can either say that we just don't know how we do it in the most complicated cases or you can quote David Hume and others who give some indications, but never a total and comprehensive answer as your "correlation is the sole basis for causation". You cannot reduce the process of jumping from a few particular cases to a cause-effect relationship to mathematical correlations of variables.

trig, in the last 300 years nobody has been able to put forward a better argument than Hume's. You're right that Hume's account is not "total and comprehensive" - Hume is the classic skeptic, undermining claims to knowledge. However, he also sets limits on knowledge, limits which have largely stood the test of time. Hume could not see any other basis for inferring causation other than correlation, and that skepticism has yet to be faulted by any major thinker. The whole trend towards making falsifiability central to the philosophy of science was a conseqence of accepting the strength of Hume's skeptical arguments.

fail

fail

Please do not make low-content posts in the upper boards. I suggest reading the Forum Rules, as you have now been warned twice about minor infractions.

that must have hurt for you to try and pull rank to make a point, and tell me where these warnings are, my inbox is empty, just like your argument and theory

that must have hurt for you to try and pull rank to make a point, and tell me where these warnings are, my inbox is empty, just like your argument and theory

We issue verbal warnings here. I'm not "pulling rank", just advising you to read the rules. Low-content posting (e.g. one-word posts like "fail") are against the rules in the upper boards. Furthermore, disputing moderation outside the Suggestions & Concerns board is also against the rules. Once again, I suggest you read the rules, as any further infractions will result in a ban.

verbal warnings on a text board? really? I must have missed that, I'll take the laptop off mute

verbal warnings on a text board? really? I must have missed that, I'll take the laptop off mute

Granted, they are written warnings. Please note that this will be your last one. Stay on topic and post within the rules. I won't ask you again.

"Verbal" just means "of or pertaining to words", so I wouldn't grant him anything...Karl, arguing with a moderator on any board is pretty dumb, honestly...now, let me see if I can catch up here. Admittedly, I have only been skimming the whole correlation/causation thing...Lord Wilmore, can you summarize your/Hume's position? I assume that the underlying idea relevant to the topic is that the show possibly establishes correlation, but this is not equivalent to demonstrating causation? 

Admittedly, I have only been skimming the whole correlation/causation thing...Lord Wilmore, can you summarize your/Hume's position? I assume that the underlying idea relevant to the topic is that the show possibly establishes correlation, but this is not equivalent to demonstrating causation? 

The discussion touches the supposed problems with Mythbuster's scientific credentials only indirectly.

The real problem is that Lord Wilmore wants to reduce the problem of finding causes for observed phenomena to such a minimal view that it is in reality made impossible in most cases.

You can find ideas for possible cause-effect relationships in the correlation of variables, but you cannot, as Lord Wilmore wants us to believe, reduce every search of a cause to a problem of correlations.

One of the several examples given here is the positive correlation, found by the University of Pensilvania Medical Center, between children sleeping with the lights on and infant myopia. By itself, this correlation seems to indicate that night lights harm children' eyes, but further studies showed that this apparent cause-effect relationship does not exist. Parents with myopic kids tend to be also myopic, so they leave the lights on to prevent accidents.

My claim is that cause-effect relationships come from all sorts of intellectual processes, most of which we do not understand because we know little about our own intellectual processes. Then we find verification for the ideas of possible relationships mostly through the scientific method. The strength of the scientific method is in the fact that several experiments are used to find evidence for the cause-effect relationship. You do not limit your verification to the original data that might have spawned the idea for a relationship.

One example that supports my claim is the way Einstein came up with the idea that became the Special Relativity Theory: when riding a tram and seeing a clock tower, he suddenly thought that the time at the clock tower might not be the same as the time at the tram. The rest is history. And Lord Wilmore has not even tried to reduce this thought process to a series of correlations.

Tell me trig, what do you think is meant by "immediate perception of our memory or senses"? If you had actually read the book, you would know that Hume is grounding causal inferences in the observation of empirical data, which he elsewhere undermines as a basis for such inferences due to the impossibility of certain knowledge. I'm sorry, but you simply don't know what you're talking about.

So, he "elsewhere undermines as a basis for such inferences" the perception of the memory and senses. How does that translate to "correlation is the sole basis for causation"? Because you still are saying Hume is your source for this claim, and you still have not shown the quote where he says so.

Hume expresses in several parts the enormous complications of the process of jumping from "perception of our memory and senses" to a reliable "causality". This is the total opposite of what you are saying, that the whole process can be reduced to one simple mathematical or statistical concept, which is the correlation.

And a model with clear cause-effect relationships is "certain knowledge". If you can infer it from correlations, it is not impossible to get to certain knowledge. If you take the stance of the impossibility of certain knowledge, then you have to say that nothing can infer causality, because knowledge of causality is certain knowledge.

As most of the time for you FE'ers, you are saying people that they do not understand because they do not read when you cannot give an answer. But please end this discussion once and for all, showing us where Hume (or anyone other than the FE'ers) says "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation".

So, he "elsewhere undermines as a basis for such inferences" the perception of the memory and senses. How does that translate to "correlation is the sole basis for causation"?

The reason this is relevant is because

the impossibility of certain knowledge

refers to the impossibility of identifying causes directly.

Because you still are saying Hume is your source for this claim, and you still have not shown the quote where he says so.

I don't really feel like leafing through my enormous annotated copy of the Treatise of Human Nature and quoting huge tracts of the work for you. Instead I'm going to present quotes from some online sources:

According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation . . . Hume held that we have no perceptual access to the necessary connection . . . but we are naturally compelled to believe in its objective existence

This refers to our natural propensity to infer causation based on correlation.

Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but through experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly conjoined with one another . . . Even after we have experience of causal connections, our conclusions from those experiences aren't based on any reasoning or on any other process of the understanding. They are based on our past experiences of similar cases, without which we could draw no conclusions at all

This refers to causation being inferred solely based on correlation.

When we examine experience to see how expectations are actually produced, we discover that they arise after we have experienced ?the constant conjunction of two objects;? only then do we ?expect the one from the appearance of the other.? . . . Custom or habit ?determines the mind?to suppose the future conformable to the past.? . . . ?either we have no idea of force or energy, and these words are altogether insignificant, or they can mean nothing but that determination of the thought, acquir'd by habit, to pass from the cause to its usual effect?

This is a combination of both of the above.


Now if need be, I am prepared to wheel out my Norton edition of the Treatise and quote from the introduction (which is considerably easier than trying to quote large swathes of Hume's actual text). However, what would be better for both of us is if you actually read the Treatise. Consider it an exercise in self-improvement.

Hume expresses in several parts the enormous complications of the process of jumping from "perception of our memory and senses" to a reliable "causality". This is the total opposite of what you are saying, that the whole process can be reduced to one simple mathematical or statistical concept, which is the correlation.

First of all, Hume never arrives at "a reliable causality". For Hume, we identify causes because we are naturally inclined to do so based on the seemingly constant correlation of events. Secondly, the bolded point has never been my argument. You are referring to the statistical definition of causation, whereas I have clearly been using the word correlation in its general sense.

And a model with clear cause-effect relationships is "certain knowledge". If you can infer it from correlations, it is not impossible to get to certain knowledge. If you take the stance of the impossibility of certain knowledge, then you have to say that nothing can infer causality, because knowledge of causality is certain knowledge.

Uh, yes? You do realise why Hume is considered the ultimate skeptical philospher, don't you?

As most of the time for you FE'ers, you are saying people that they do not understand because they do not read when you cannot give an answer. But please end this discussion once and for all, showing us where Hume (or anyone other than the FE'ers) says "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation".

No trig, the simple truth is that you don't know what you're talking about. I have now presented quotations from other sources demonstrating my point. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philospophy article I have quoted in support of my argument contains references to the relevant sections of the Treatise. If that isn't enough for you, then I'm not sure I can be bothered to quote the same sections myself.

Lord Wilmore, can you summarize your/Hume's position? I assume that the underlying idea relevant to the topic is that the show possibly establishes correlation, but this is not equivalent to demonstrating causation? 

I think the above summarises Hume's position quite well. Here's another summary of the argument which puts it quite well:

David Hume described the problem in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ?4, based on his epistemological framework. Here, "reason" refers to deductive reasoning and "induction" refers to inductive reasoning.

First, Hume ponders the discovery of causal relations, which form the basis for what he refers to as "matters of fact." He argues that causal relations are found not by reason, but by induction. This is because for any cause, multiple effects are conceivable, and the actual effect cannot be determined by reasoning about the cause; instead, one must observe occurrences of the causal relation to discover that it holds. For example, when one thinks of "a billiard ball moving in a straight line toward another,"[7] one can conceive that the first ball bounces back with the second ball remaining at rest, the first ball stops and the second ball moves, or the first ball jumps over the second, etc. There is no reason to conclude any of these possibilities over the others. Only through previous observation can it be predicted, inductively, what will actually happen with the balls. In general, it is not necessary that causal relation in the future resemble causal relations in the past, as it is always conceivable otherwise; for Hume, this is because the negation of the claim does not lead to a contradiction.

Next, Hume ponders the justification of induction. If all matters of fact are based on causal relations, and all causal relations are found by induction, then induction must be shown to be valid somehow. He uses the fact that induction assumes a valid connection between the proposition "I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect" and the proposition "I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar will be attended with similar effects."[8] One connects these two propositions not by reason, but by induction. This claim is supported by the same reasoning as that for causal relations above, and by the observation that even rationally inexperienced or inferior people can infer, for example, that touching fire causes pain. Hume challenges other philosophers to come up with a (deductive) reason for the connection. If he is right, then the justification of induction can be only inductive. But this begs the question; as induction is based on an assumption of the connection, it cannot itself explain the connection.

In this way, the problem of induction is not only concerned with the uncertainty of conclusions derived by induction, but doubts the very principle through which those uncertain conclusions are derived.

Quote from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume#Causation

According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation . . . Hume held that we have no perceptual access to the necessary connection . . . but we are naturally compelled to believe in its objective existence

This refers to our natural propensity to infer causation based on correlation.

This is more than enough to declare this discussion finished: association is not the same as correlation.

Association is a very wide concept, where any kind of information is processed simultaneously with another. I can associate the devil to black cats through the color black, bells with food through Pavlov's famous experiment, or monsters with extraterrestrials through the concept of fear.

Correlation is a much more specific statistical concept, where two or more variables are compared through a mathematical operation, giving a specific value that tells us the probability that somehow the variables are related.

So, to quote Lord Wilmore's own quote, "it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation". It is not correlation, it is association. And I fully agree. Arguably, the only thing the brain ever does is associating incoming signals and, based on the association, producing outgoing signals.

Also, look at what I found when googling "define: correlation". I chose to show the first definitions, so as not to cherry-pick:

# a reciprocal relation between two or more things
# correlation coefficient: a statistic representing how closely two variables co-vary; it can vary from -1 (perfect negative correlation) through 0 (no correlation) to +1 (perfect positive correlation); "what is the correlation between those two variables?"
# a statistical relation between two or more variables such that systematic changes in the value of one variable are accompanied by systematic changes in the other
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

# Correlation is a measure of relationship between two mathematical variables or measured data values, which includes the Pearson correlation coefficient as a special case.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_(disambiguation)

I see no "general sense" of the word that helps your point at all. If you want to argue about science and philosophy you have to use the terms as they are defined, not as you want to. Correlation is not association in any of its commonly accepted definitions.

You are like the school kid that got flunked in Physics and went to his teacher to argue that "I was using Relativity in the general sense: nothing is absolute".

This is more than enough to declare this discussion finished: association is not the same as correlation.

You need to pay attention trig, because you are not actually grasping what is being posted. Read the quote again:

According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation . . . Hume held that we have no perceptual access to the necessary connection . . . but we are naturally compelled to believe in its objective existence

We associate constantly conjoined events. And what is another way of describing the constant conjoining of events? That's right, correlation. So we infer (or associate) causes based on correlation (or constantly conjoined events). I suggest you invest in a thesaurus.

Also, look at what I found when googling "define: correlation". I chose to show the first definitions, so as not to cherry-pick:

Quote

# a reciprocal relation between two or more things
# correlation coefficient: a statistic representing how closely two variables co-vary; it can vary from -1 (perfect negative correlation) through 0 (no correlation) to +1 (perfect positive correlation); "what is the correlation between those two variables?"
# a statistical relation between two or more variables such that systematic changes in the value of one variable are accompanied by systematic changes in the other
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

# Correlation is a measure of relationship between two mathematical variables or measured data values, which includes the Pearson correlation coefficient as a special case.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_(disambiguation)

I see no "general sense" of the word that helps your point at all. If you want to argue about science and philosophy you have to use the terms as they are defined, not as you want to. Correlation is not association in any of its commonly accepted definitions.

You are like the school kid that got flunked in Physics and went to his teacher to argue that "I was using Relativity in the general sense: nothing is absolute".

Here are the first definitions I get when I put "correlation definition" into Google:

1. A mutual relationship or connection between two or more things.

1. A causal, complementary, parallel, or reciprocal relationship, especially a structural, functional, or qualitative correspondence between two comparable entities

mutual relation of two or more things, parts, etc.

So I guess you were wrong about there being "no general sense" of the word that helps your point at all". You were also wrong to imply that I was equating association with causation; this is because you were not paying attention. Finally, you were wrong about Hume's argument.


So tell me trig, what exactly is the basis for whatever argument you're making? All I see is a lot of denial and frothing of the mouth.

Nothing else can be done here. I quote again your own quote, where it says "it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation".

You can play fancy word games all you like, but in the end, you have not said anything better than what markjo said some 5 pages ago: "correlation does not imply causation, but it is a good place to start".

You can try to choose three words here, two there, and declare that Hume said those five words in one sentence, but in reality you just have not found a place where the phrase "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation" has been said by anyone but yourself. "constantly conjoined events" might be a synonym for the word "correlation" but the rest of the phrase is missing. The phrase that is there, and does not have to be created imaginatively picking parts from several quotes is:

      "it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation".

The phrase that is there, and does not have to be created imaginatively picking parts from several quotes is:

      "it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation".

Okay, read the quote slowly. See the word I have bolded? Association is the basis for the concept of causation. The concept of causation is not any particular cause. It is the concept we have that effects have causes. Particular causes, however, are inferred based on "constantly conjoined events" - in other words, correlation.


Seriously, you're just not reading these quotes carefully. You're going "Association! Basis! Causation! Hume says association is the basis for causation! Not correlation!" Of course this is not what he actually contends - Hume was an empiricist for crying out loud! He believed that we were naturally predisposed to infer causation based on the correlation of events. This natural tendency to associate correlation as indicative of causation that forms the basis for our conception of causality. However, it is empirical correlation which forms the basis for any particular inference.


In other words, we only infer causes based on the correlation of empirical data. However, the reason we make such inferences is because of a natural tendency to associate empirical correlation with causal relationships.

You can try to choose three words here, two there, and declare that Hume said those five words in one sentence, but in reality you just have not found a place where the phrase "correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation" has been said by anyone but yourself.

So basically your argument is that because I cannot quote Hume saying those exact words, I am wrong, even though his argument conveys precisely the same meaning (which is all I ever claimed)? Are you serious?

So, "the concept of causation" is not "causation"? Get real.

And, yes, you have to quote somebody directly saying something very similar to "correlation is the sole base for inferring causation", since your claim is that Hume says so. Taking a few words from one sentence and a few from another sentence in another chapter is never acceptable quoting.

You cannot even get somebody that explains how the words of Hume somehow can be twisted into yours.

So, "the concept of causation" is not "causation"? Get real.

No, it isn't. Just think about it for a second: why would he say "the concept of causation" if he just meant causation? It would be a totally redundant use of the word.


The simple fact is that in context, there is a perfectly obvious explanation. Look at the title of the work: A Treatise of Human Nature. It is Hume's attempt to explain/understand how our minds work, hence "the mental act of association is the basis of our concept of causation". The "mental act of association" means "associating constantly conjoined events", i.e. inferring causation based on correlation.


That mental act is essentially instinctive, and a fundamental part of human nature. It is because of this automatic process of association that we always seek a cause for every effect. So although the mental act of association is the basis for our concept of causation, any particular instance of causal inference is based on a particular association of constantly conjoined events.

And, yes, you have to quote somebody directly saying something very similar to "correlation is the sole base for inferring causation", since your claim is that Hume says so. Taking a few words from one sentence and a few from another sentence in another chapter is never acceptable quoting.

You cannot even get somebody that explains how the words of Hume somehow can be twisted into yours.

Look, I really don't see how you can interpret the following quote (for example) any other way:

Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but through experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly conjoined with one another . . . Even after we have experience of causal connections, our conclusions from those experiences aren't based on any reasoning or on any other process of the understanding. They are based on our past experiences of similar cases, without which we could draw no conclusions at all

That quote is identical in meaning to what I am arguing. However, I am getting tired of this, so I am going to transcribe a summary of Hume's argument from the introduction to the Norton & Norton edition of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. Read carefully:

1. The inspection of any two events or objects, one of which is said necessarily to cause the other, never reveals a direct causal link or power that connects these two items.

2. The idea of power or necessary connection arises from the conjunction of two events or objects, or two events or objects of the same type.

3. The repetition of a conjunction neither reveals nor causes anything new in the events or objects said to be necessarily connected. But such a repetition does produce a 'customary transition' in the mind. It causes us to infer from the experience of one item of a customarily conjoined pair the second item in that pair.

4. This 'customary transition' is the source of an impression, namely, a felt determination of the mind. This determination is in turn the source of our idea of necessary connection?this determination copied, in the way that ideas copy impressions, is the idea of necessary connection.

5. It follows that causal power and necessary connection are feelings of the mind, not qualities found in events or objects.

Here we see a clear distinction between the basis for our inferences (point 2) and the nature of those inferences (point 3). Also, here's a couple of direct quotes from the text itself, which are slightly more flowery in their language:

The necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustom'd union. These are, therefore, the same.

how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind

I have now quoted Wikipedia, the Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy, the Norton & Norton introduction to the Treatise, and the work itself in support of my argument. You're wrong, trig.

Quote from: trig on May 05, 2011, 10:07:39 AM

So, "the concept of causation" is not "causation"? Get real.

No, it isn't. Just think about it for a second: why would he say "the concept of causation" if he just meant causation? It would be a totally redundant use of the word.

Noted for false stupidity. I know you are not that dumb, but you really make anyone jump to the chance of saying "Oh, how stupid those FE'ers can be!!!"

Just say that you know that every phrase everyone writes carefully is a balance between too much redundancy and too succinct phrases that people do not understand, a balance of different styles of writing. Say that you were just making a joke.

Noted for false stupidity. I know you are not that dumb, but you really make anyone jump to the chance of saying "Oh, how stupid those FE'ers can be!!!"

Just say that you know that every phrase everyone writes carefully is a balance between too much redundancy and too succinct phrases that people do not understand, a balance of different styles of writing. Say that you were just making a joke.

trig, the quotes I have presented clearly show a distinction between the two in Hume's philosophy, and if you read the Wikipedia entry that quote is taken from, it's clear that the concept of causation is meant, not causation itself. Take a look:

The notion of causation is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation.

Notice the correspondence between the two sentences: 'notion' and 'concept' clearly correspond to one another (as do the references to induction). This tallies with Hume's work, where he not only analyses how we infer causation in particular instances, but why we infer causation in general.


To go back to the Treatise itself, look at the five points I quoted from the introduction to the Norton & Norton edition. Point 2 refers to how particular ideas of causal power are inferred. However, by point 5 he is talking about our concept of causality in general. Hume clearly distinguishes between the two, first identifying the empirical basis for causal inference (correlation/repetition/constantly conjoined events), and then arguing that this itself does cannot signify any 'necessary connection', but that our conviction must result from the influence of correlation on the mind.


It's right there in the quotes, and you're (literally) just ignoring them, whilst trying to pass off a half-baked and nonsensical intepretation of that sentence in isolation as representative of Hume's argument.

Until you show that Hume says something very close to "Please do not confuse what I call 'concept of causality' with what I call 'causality'", it is good bye for me.

And since Hume did not say anything even close, it is good bye.

Until you show that Hume says something very close to "Please do not confuse what I call 'concept of causality' with what I call 'causality'", it is good bye for me.

And since Hume did not say anything even close, it is good bye.

You're asking me to provide a quote from Hume which addresses your inability to follow a 5-point argument, 270 years in advance? Of course no such quote exists - Hume probably assumed that his audience had both the capacity and decency to read his work attentively.


I have shown you plenty of quotes from Hume which support the positions I have taken in this argument. This is because I know the Treatise of Human Nature quite well, especialy the first book. What baffles me is why you have chosen to pick this argument, when almost all of 20th century philosophy of science results from Popper's acceptance of Hume and his consequent focus on falsifiability. That's why Popper turns away from scientific validation: he accepts the critiques of causality and induction which Hume presented.


What baffles me even more is why I have continued to debate with you, when you have consistently failed to address my arguments or respond to the textual support I have presented.


In summary, correlation is the sole basis for inferring causation, or, as Hume put it

how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of [causal] power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind

Quote from: 1.3.14.24

how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of [causal] power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind

I'm not a philosopher so I could be wrong, but that quote looks like it disagrees with your point.

Quote from: Lord Wilmore on May 05, 2011, 07:03:54 PM

Quote from: 1.3.14.24

how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of [causal] power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind

I'm not a philosopher so I could be wrong, but that quote looks like it disagrees with your point.

You are more than enough of a philosopher. I had not read all of the last post of Lord Wilmore, but you did find his clearest contradiction in a snap,

I'm not a philosopher so I could be wrong, but that quote looks like it disagrees with your point.

In what way? What do you think is meant by "this idea [of causal power] arises from the repetition of their union"? Honestly, I'm all ears, but I don't see what else it could mean.